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What factors led to victory for the Republican candidate in the 2010 governor’s race in 
Ohio? My research demonstrates that Democratic candidates are generally favored in Ohio 
counties with high unemployment. Ohio’s unemployment nearly doubled in size from 2006 to 
2010. Why was Democratic incumbent Governor Ted Strickland unable to capitalize on this 
historical advantage? I argue that Strickland’s loss can be attributed to his inability to shift the 
“blame” onto the national level, due a Democratic president and Strickland’s visible ties to the 
Obama Administration. John Kasich was electorally successful because he was able to control 
the economic debate, verified through campaign and media output. 
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Introduction 
The 2010 midterm elections commanded national headlines and seized the attention of 
the country. The Tea-Party Movement, heated rhetoric, and high stakes added to the excitement. 
The bellwether State of Ohio’s gubernatorial race was no exception to this trend. This election 
determined if Democratic incumbent governor, Ted Strickland, would maintain control of the 
statehouse or if the Republican challenger, John Kasich, would seize control with a victory. 
My analysis of this election investigates the causal factors of John Kasich’s gubernatorial 
victory. In the first section, I provide an overview of the campaign. This provides a solid 
foundation in understanding major campaign events. Next, I explore existing literature on 
theories of gubernatorial success. In the third section, I present the data I collected and the 
importance of the data and methods I employed in my analysis. I address theories of 
gubernatorial success and explain how I will account for these theories in my analysis of the 
2010 gubernatorial election in Ohio. In the fourth section, I present my analysis of the data and 
examine my findings. I further explore the underlying reasons for Kasich’s victory. Finally, I 
provide a summary of my findings in my conclusion.  
Overview of the Campaign 
June 2, 2009 was the official kick-off of the election with Kasich’s announcement of his 
bid for the Ohio governorship. Kasich eventually ran unopposed in the primary after state 
senator, Kevin Coughlin, withdrew his bid. In his announcement speech, Kasich emphasized 
“personal responsibility” and economic prosperity, principles he has advocated throughout his 
political career.  
Kasich was born and raised in a working-class town in Southeast Pennsylvania. After 
high school, Kasich relocated to Ohio to attend The Ohio State University. Kasich commenced 
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his political career as a senator in the Ohio General Assembly where he served from 1979 to 
1982. He moved on to become the representative for Ohio 12th district and garnered the powerful 
position of Chairman of the House Budget Committee. While in this position, Kasich had 
tremendous influence in balancing the federal budget. This was one of the biggest 
accomplishments for Republicans after they seized control of the House in 1994. Kasich touted 
this accomplishment throughout his gubernatorial bid and frequently expressed his aspirations to 
balance the Ohio budget. After serving in the House for nine terms, Kasich moved to the private 
sector and focused his efforts in business and media. Kasich considered a possible presidential 
bid in 2000, even forming an exploratory committee. After the Iowa Caucuses, Kasich cast off 
this interest and endorsed then-former governor, George W. Bush. Kasich worked as a managing 
director for Lehman Brothers, a position that came back to haunt him throughout the 
gubernatorial race. The extent of Kasich’s association with the failed Lehman Brothers was a 
question debated by both sides and used by Democrats to tie Kasich to “Wall Street values.” 
Kasich also held a commentator position at the Fox News Network and eventually hosted his 
own program. He wrote several bestselling books, including Every Other Monday, a faith-based 
book published and released during the campaign. 
A “Republican with rough edges,” Kasich is known for his unscripted and sometimes 
politically vulnerable remarks and his “fighter” attitude (Apple 1998). This quality surfaced 
often in his attacks against incumbent Governor Strickland, another candidate with a strong 
political history in Ohio. 
Like John Kasich, Ted Strickland also came from a blue-collar background. Strickland 
was born in Lucasville, a small town in southern Ohio. Following high school, Strickland earned 
a Bachelor of Arts degree from Asbury College, a Masters of Art and a Master’s of Divinity, and 
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finally a Ph.D. in counseling psychology. Strickland served as an ordained Methodist minister, 
psychologist at a state correctional facility, and professor preceding his career in public service. 
Strickland was also elected as a member of Congress, serving from 1993 to 1995 and again from 
1997 to 2006. Strickland represented the long-spanning 6th district of Ohio. While in Congress, 
Strickland coauthored the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Strickland would go on to 
advocate for these types of social programs as governor.  
In 2006, Strickland glided into the Governor’s mansion after swiftly defeating Secretary 
of State Kenneth Blackwell. Strickland promised to “Turn around Ohio” during his highly 
successful campaign bid. He campaigned against the unpopular policies of the Bush 
administration and gained the endorsement of law enforcement groups, teacher groups, and most 
of the major Ohio newspapers. Strickland secured the Democratic vote and was able to gain the 
support of many Republicans. While Strickland was economically liberal, he touted moderate 
and even some conservative social principles. Strickland had a strong pro-gun rating from the 
NRA and held moderate views on abortion. His status as an ordained minister also appealed to 
religious conservatives. Strickland gained a little over sixty percent of the vote while his 
opponent, Kenneth Blackwell, earned around thirty-seven percent of the votes. 
Strickland’s tenure as governor has been described as “rocky.” During Strickland’s 
tenure, Ohio’s population decreased while unemployment increased, brewing an unsavory 
combination for this incumbent seeking re-election. The Great Recession loomed over the 
economy nationwide. It was uncertain to voters how much blame should actually be placed on 
Strickland and his decisions, yet Strickland’s approval rating unquestionably suffered. Following 
Kasich’s announcement, Strickland had a 52 percent approval rating (Quinn 2009). The 
administration was plagued by a budget crisis and several mishaps, including the 
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mismanagement of a list of state employees and their social security numbers. During his tenure, 
Strickland also changed his position on gambling, a move making him politically vulnerable. 
At the start of the campaign, Kasich touted fiscally-conservative principles, even 
proposing an elimination of the state income tax and the implementation of a “fair tax,” a tax 
based solely on sales. Kasich contended that this would help bring businesses and individuals to 
the state. These references to the economy proved to be important throughout the course of the 
election. Like the rest of the nation, Ohio was plagued by high unemployment and growing state 
deficits. 
Leadership in the Ohio Democratic Party immediately attempted to label Kasich as a 
“Wall Street insider” due to his previous employment at Lehman Brothers. Kasich struggled to 
fight this image throughout the entire campaign. 
In the statehouse, Strickland was busy fighting a budget war against the Republican 
majority in the state senate. Caught up in budget shortfalls, Strickland converted from his 
original position of opposition to gambling in Ohio to support this measure in order to raise 
additional revenue. This gambling position followed Strickland through the campaign. Lengthy 
debates between Strickland and Senate Majority leader, Bill Harris, and other Republicans 
elongated the passage of a state budget. Ohio voters did not look favorably on this apparent 
inability to control the direction of the state budget. Strickland’s approval rating dropped to 46 
percent (Quinn 2009). Meanwhile, Kasich was able to capitalize on the budget fiasco by pointing 
to the ineffectiveness of Governor Strickland’s leadership. While Kasich admitted he was not 
“ideologically opposed” to gambling, he described Strickland’s measure as “goofy” and unable 
“to produce the numbers they're saying it's going to produce” (Hallet 2009). Other than a few 
comments like the previous, Kasich was able to take a “backseat” and allow Strickland’s poll 
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numbers to self-destruct. Kasich turned his efforts to name-recognition and attempted to undo the 
perception of his close ties to Wall Street that the Ohio Democratic Party had promulgated. 
  The budget “stalemate” finally ended after an executive order authorizing slot machines. 
Governor Strickland also used his executive power to line-item veto numerous proposals in the 
budget. The budget included several cuts which angered many state employees. Additionally, 
Strickland praised the unpopular federal stimulus program and advocated for a second stimulus 
to assist in budget shortfalls in Ohio. Following this grueling battle, the governor refocused his 
efforts to promoting education programs, a steady issue throughout his administration. 
Nationwide, the federal stimulus and healthcare debates stirred division within the 
country. The stimulus, tied to the budget crisis, was also tied to new services and projects funded 
by the stimulus. In Ohio, the debate turned to the controversial high-speed passenger rail system. 
Along with other prominent Midwest leaders, Strickland advocated for Ohio’s piece of the rail-
system, connecting the 3 “Cs,” Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati. This measure was 
criticized by John Kasich as “wasteful spending.” This particular instance accurately depicted the 
differing ideologies concerning the role of the federal government between the two candidates.  
In November of 2009, the gambling issue resurfaced. This time it reemerged at the polls 
as Issue 3. Ohio voters approved the building of casinos in Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati and 
Toledo. While projected casino tax-revenue was expected to fill the budget gap, voters were left 
wondering about Strickland’s indecisive position on the issue and his overall ability to lead Ohio 
effectively. 
In January 2010, both Kasich and Strickland announced their running mates. Kasich 
selected state-Auditor Mary Taylor. Taylor’s tenure as Auditor and her CPA status enticed the 
Kasich campaign team. In his announcement of his running mate, Kasich “praised Mary Taylor’s 
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fiscal skills” (Fields 2010). Strickland was also charged with selecting a new running mate. 
Strickland’s lieutenant governor, Lee Fisher, decided to run for the open Senate seat. Strickland 
turned to the well-respected community leader, Yvette McGee Brown. Brown was the founding 
president of the Center for Child & Family Advocacy at the Nationwide Children's Hospital and 
a former Franklin County juvenile court judge (Fields 2010). Brown shared Strickland’s passion 
for education and children’s issues. Both choices echoed the goals of the respective campaigns. 
While these choices were important in that they represented the overall tone of the campaign, 
these selections were in no way “game-changing” or unexpected.  
 Shortly following the announcement of his running mate, Strickland delivered the State 
of the State speech. Strickland’s State of the State speech highlighted programs that Strickland 
believed would bring jobs to Ohio. He stressed the importance of the renewal of the “Third 
Frontier,” a program that “makes investments through bond sales to foster technology transfer 
from university, medical and other research centers to the private sector” (Fields and Marshall 
2010). The influence of election year politics was apparent in the Republicans’ unyielding attack 
against not only Strickland’s speech, but more generally, the policies of the Strickland 
administration. 
 As campaign reserves grew, attacks between the candidates steadily increased. 
Nationwide, the Tea Party gained momentum and Republicans attacked the economic policies of 
the Democratic Party. In Massachusetts, Scott Brown won the late-Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat in 
an unprecedented victory. Kasich, a friend to the Tea Party, continued to attack Strickland for the 
lack of jobs and unfriendly business climate in Ohio. Strickland was unrelenting in his criticism 
of Kasich’s association with Lehman Brothers and Wall Street. This criticism and public 
pressure prompted Kasich to release his income tax return from the previous year to prove he did 
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not profit in the hands of Wall Street. His returns showed that while Kasich was a millionaire, 
the Lehman portion of his income totaled around $587,175 plus benefits (Fields and Naymik 
2010). Critics still pressed Kasich to release his decade-long returns. 
At the end of April 2010, a scandal arose out of the governor’s mansion concerning an 
inmate work program. Strickland, a long advocate of inmate “rehabilitation” programs, allowed 
inmates to work at the governor’s mansion. Some of the program’s participants developed a 
smuggling operation right out of Strickland’s home. Furthermore, there were accusations of a 
cover-up by some state officials and the fabricated testimony of Safety Director Cathy Collins-
Taylor. While Strickland was not connected to any of these unlawful events, Strickland 
appointed her for reconfirmation, which the Ohio Senate rejected (Niquette 2010). 
The summer preceding the election amplified the themes propelled in the beginning of 
the election. Strickland fired the first ad against Kasich and his Wall Street ties. These negative 
ads foreshadowed the negative ads to follow produced by the Strickland campaign. Kasich 
traveled the State of Ohio touting his plan to bring jobs and business growth. The Republican 
Governors Association was quick to fire back anti-Strickland ads in a series that featured 
“ordinary” Ohioans and their frustration with the economic conditions in the state. Kasich also 
released his faith-based memoir, Every Other Sunday. The tax release issue resurfaced, this time 
concerning decade-long tax returns. President Obama made several trips to the Buckeye State in 
support of Strickland in both the summer and the fall. Republican leaders such as Indiana 
governor Mitch Daniels stumped for Kasich. 
Another important issue, not tied to the economy, was the gun-control issue. Ted 
Strickland had a long history of gun rights support. He earned an A-rating from the NRA. The 
Strickland campaign exposed Kasich’s less than favorable ratings by the same conservative- 
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leaning group. In 1994, Kasich received an F-rating from the organization for his support of a 
ban on assault rifles. Kasich quickly back-pedaled, trying to defend his pro-gun stance, hoping to 
retain members of the conservative base. 
Between the archetypical campaign ads and budget proposals, a few other atypical 
campaign events arose. Strickland was criticized by the Kasich campaign for his participation in 
a video urging basketball star Lebron James to stay with the Cleveland Cavilers, while Kasich 
was criticized for not caring enough about the matter. A member of the Kasich campaign also 
committed a political faux pas when he described Strickland’s childhood home as a “chicken 
coop.” Even after a public apology, the matter had already gained public traction. The Strickland 
campaign accused Kasich and his campaign as “out of touch” with average Ohioans. 
Rapidly approaching November 2nd, the candidates agreed to two debates. The debates 
were hosted by the Ohio Newspaper Organization and held in Columbus and Toledo. The 
candidates answered questions primarily concerning jobs and the economy, with a few questions 
pertaining to social issues. The candidates differed on the outlook of the state economy. Kasich 
pointed out what he saw as mistakes made by the Strickland Administration, while Strickland 
maintained an exceedingly upbeat tone. When cornered, Strickland once again fired the Wall 
Street attacks and argued that economic problems were nationwide and not just exclusive to the 
State of Ohio. Overall the debates stayed civil, yet not overly-friendly. 
 Outside of the debates, Kasich and Strickland clearly defined their stances and their 
differences. Kasich strongly advocated more emphasis on the private sector, including the 
privatization of the Department of Development, while Strickland touted programs located in the 
public sector. Kasich’s JobsOhio promised to bring new incentives and initiatives to attract 
business growth in the Buckeye State. Kasich and Strickland wrestled over how to fix education 
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in Ohio. While Strickland stood firmly to his belief in the importance of public-school funding, 
Kasich proposed increased competition and new performance evaluators in schools. 
 Donations continued to grow as Kasich surpassed Strickland in fundraising. A debatable 
donation was made to the Republican Governors Association, a group unaffiliated with the 
Kasich campaign but with the ability to discredit Strickland. Kasich’s former Fox News boss, 
Rupert Murdoch, made a hefty one million dollar donation to the RGA. While the Kasich 
campaign denied any ties, this donation was questionable in the eyes of some Ohioans. Another 
group, Our Future Ohio, quickly surfaced and started to attack Kasich with $2.5 million dollars 
worth of ads. Republicans called foul on this group, an accusation never proved true or false. 
 High profile politicians steadily rolled into Ohio as the election neared. President Obama 
made yet another visit to stump for Democratic candidates. Kasich held his own rally with 
popular Republican governors Haley Barbour, Tim Pawlenty, and Chris Christie.  
 After much smearing and election board contests, November 2nd finally arrived. Kasich 
held the lead in the polls, but not to the same wide margin he had held earlier in the race. Kasich 
defeated Strickland in the closest race for governor in 32 years. The Cleveland Plain Dealer 
reported that “John Kasich rode a wave of voter anger Tuesday to become Ohio's 69th governor 
in a race that proved to be a referendum on incumbents and the state's anemic economy” (Fields 
Naymik 2010). The Cincinnati Enquirer reported the excited exclamation that Kasich opened his 
victory speech. "Guess what?'' he shouted to the crowd. “I'm going to be governor of Ohio!'' 
Following a long campaign, filled with promises, smear, and other oddities, the State of Ohio 
finally had its next governor. 
 What factors were most central to Kasich’s victory? My analysis includes several 
elements of gubernatorial electoral success, including state unemployment figures, incumbency 
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status, campaign and media output, and national influences to explicate Kasich’s victory over 
Strickland. My analysis indicates that Democratic gubernatorial candidates benefit in counties 
with high unemployment in the State of Ohio. However, my analysis also suggests that the 
highest benefit is achieved in the case when there is a Republican president. This suggests that 
Democratic gubernatorial candidates are able to effectively “shift the blame” onto Republican 
presidents. However, when a Democratic president is in power, Democratic gubernatorial 
candidates do not electorally benefit at a high level in harsh economic times. With regards to the 
2010 election, Strickland was unable to shift the blame for high unemployment in Ohio into the 
national arena due to a Democratic president in power. Furthermore, by directing his attacks at 
John Kasich and his association to Lehman Brothers, Strickland wasted valuable time and 
resources. While I am unable to measure the effects of an alternative campaign strategy, 
Strickland may have fared better if he attempted to “blame” the previous Bush administration. 
Correspondingly, I argue that national political factors are invaluable for analysis and most 
certainly contribute to the outcome of this specific case.  
 In the next section, I will explore existing literature on theories of gubernatorial electoral 
success. Although literature is sparse in this area of political study, I will draw on articles that 
offer insight to understanding the findings of my research. Following the literature review, I will 
present my research specific to the State of Ohio. I will explain what types of data I collected and 
the importance of this data and the methods I employed in my analysis. Subsequently, I will 
further address my argument concerning the electoral success of John Kasich in the 2010 Ohio 
gubernatorial election. I will draw on the data that I have collected and discuss the steps that 
directed me to my conclusion.  
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Theories of Gubernatorial Electoral Success 
Political scientists are divided on what factors most affect the electoral outcome in 
gubernatorial elections. This specific type of election is much different from other local, state, 
and national races mainly due to the variety of influences and the nature of the office. 
Gubernatorial elections lack “systemic data on state-level events and on governors themselves, 
which imposes limits on our current ability to understand the link between governors and their 
constituents” (MacDonald 1999). The position of governor is subject to evaluation based on 
executive performance, yet the evaluation can, knowingly or unknowingly, be viewed through a 
lens blurred by national trends and influences. This includes presidential performance and party 
approval. Additionally, an incumbent governor seeking reelection may be evaluated on the 
condition of the economy. Many scholars argue that retrospective analysis is one of the main 
factors voters employ when deciding what candidate or party for which to cast their vote. These 
economic evaluations include unemployment, economic growth, taxes, and varying 
combinations of these indicators. The importance of fundraising and campaign spending are 
factors that echo through all types of races, including gubernatorial elections. Incumbency can 
benefit or disadvantage a candidate based on his or her perceived performance while occupying 
the office. Finally, additional factors such as the perceptions and characteristics of specific 
candidates and further types of issue-based voting may also play a role in election outcomes. In 
the next section, I will explore prevailing theories of electoral success and the arguments made 
by their proponents. 
National Politics 
 In his article “Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections,” John E. 
Chubb (1998) argues that certain national factors play a role in statewide elections. He contends 
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that presidential turnout and coattails have significant effects on voter participation. While these 
types of influences may be a factor in some states, it is not the case for a state like Ohio, which 
holds off-year, midterm elections for the office of governor. 
Chubb proposes that while state economic conditions can influence elections, “state 
elections are becoming more susceptible to swings in the national economy” (Chubb 1998). His 
model examines the changes in real per capita income, a measure that attempts to account for 
both national and state economic conditions. He also looks at the perceptions of the economy 
held by the average voter. He finds that gubernatorial elections are “perturbed by national 
conditions.” Heavily influenced by these economic trends, presidential approval ratings play a 
role in these elections. This is reflected at a higher rate in states which hold on-year elections. 
Chubb asserts factors specific to the election including personality characteristics of the 
candidates and party associations may also play a role in voter choice. 
Other theorists on the evaluation of gubernatorial performance, such as Brown (2010), 
argue that blame or satisfaction is assigned to the governor or president in varying degrees by the 
electorate. When evaluating an incumbent governor running for reelection, voters often attribute 
the successes or failures of the governor on the basis of political party affiliation.  
Brown argues that “Americans rely heavily on partisan shortcuts when deciding whether 
to hold their governor (as opposed to President) responsible for state-level policy outcomes” 
(Brown 2010). This is especially helpful to voters when they are unable to differentiate the 
responsibilities of either office. This type of partisan-lens theory follows from the party 
identification arguments first made by the authors of The American Voter. Its authors contend 
that politics “can be very complex, so it is important for citizens to be able to use simple cues to 
interpret what they cannot experience directly” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). 
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Brown examines the 2006 election results of races with Democratic incumbents. He selects only 
Democratic incumbents in order to contrast them to Republican President George W. Bush. He 
finds that voters’ perceptions of the economy are largely based on partisan evaluations. Those 
voters that identified themselves as Democrats in a state with a Democratic governor would most 
likely assign the blame to the president if economic conditions were unfavorable. Republicans in 
the state with a Democratic governor would assign the blame for economic hardship to the 
governor, and not the president. Those voters in a state absent this sort of divided federalism 
would be unable to assign varying degrees of blame. However, the economic outlook of these 
voters would be susceptible to influence based on their own partisan attitudes.  
Although national factors are important to examine when performing an analysis of a 
particular election, they are not a direct predictor of election outcome. The difficulty in 
separating the state economy from the national economy leads to this inconsistency. 
Campaign Money 
 Campaign money can be used on literature or media spots to increase name-recognition 
of a particular candidate, discredit an opponent, communicate with base voters and sway 
independent voters, along with numerous other strategic operations. Campaign money has been 
termed the “mother’s milk of politics” (Partin 2002). Political scientists, including Randall Partin 
and Kihong Eom, attempt to measure the affect of the dollar on gubernatorial elections (2002 and 
2006). 
 Partin argues that campaign spending, specifically in gubernatorial elections, 
“dramatically influences the outcomes of these races” (Partin 2002). Gubernatorial elections are 
highly visible and “competitive” races. Incumbents benefit from name-recognition. This makes 
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amplified name-recognition for challengers a critical portion of the campaign and requires high 
media output generated through campaign funds and spending.  
After accounting for other possible influences in state-wide contests, Partin examines the 
trends in campaign expenditures and general electoral success. His results find that candidates 
benefit from campaign expenditures at varying degrees. Out-party candidates tend to benefit 
from increased spending at a much higher rate than in-party candidates. 
 Kihong Eom (2006) also explores the differences in spending benefits between 
incumbents and challengers. He examines the allegations that campaign contribution limits 
unfairly favor incumbents by looking at the varying types of campaign contributors. Some 
contributors are “particularistic,” in that they favor influence over a specific policy, while other 
contributors are more candidate-oriented or “universalistic” contributors. By differentiating 
between these two types of contributors, Eom finds that campaign contribution limits 
increasingly influence particularistic contributors to donate to both candidates. This is to “insure” 
favorable policy measures, no matter what the outcome of the election. This reduces the 
campaign contribution “bias” that favors the incumbent and works to foster a more competitive 
race. 
 Campaign contributions are important for message output by both candidates. 
Nevertheless, the extent of the help is questionable. Certain instances, such as the defeat of 
candidates with very large budgets, raise serious concerns with using campaign contributions in 
accounting for all instances of gubernatorial success. Campaign contributions make up one of 
many multi-causal factors in gubernatorial election outcomes.  
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Incumbency 
 As the popularity of an incumbent seeking reelection increases, his or her chance of 
success in a campaign is directly boosted. James E. Piereson (1977) notes a slight transition in 
factors that account for candidate success in gubernatorial elections from 1910 to 1970. During 
this time, he documents a decline in the importance of party identification and an increase in the 
importance of incumbency. He emphasizes the necessity of further study on this matter to 
explore if this is a lasting trend or if it merely attempts to account for some other unknown 
variable. 
 In his article, “The Electoral Fortunes of Gubernatorial Incumbents,” Mark E. Tompkins 
(1984) presents an inconclusive analysis on the effects of incumbency as well. He notes the 
“growth in the importance of incumbency in the last decade” and weighs the advantages and 
burdens that come with office. He rejects the institutional argument that bureaucratic resources 
greatly enhance the reelection prospects for the incumbent and points to the importance of 
performance while in office along with the advantages for those identified as “outstanding” 
governors. His theory also requires analysis of additional elections. 
 James D. King argues that the incumbent popularity is an important factor in examining 
gubernatorial electoral success that has been largely overlooked. He contends that in numerous 
statewide elections, voters hold incumbents “directly accountable” (King 2001). In his article, 
King creates a model that includes other theories of gubernatorial success and measures them 
against incumbency status and popularity. In open contests, voters are likely to base their 
decision on the previous governor from the same political party. King is only able to perform this 
analysis for four states, due to the nature of the survey questions asked. Most survey questions do 
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not include any type of reference to incumbency, making it increasingly difficult to measure 
voter preference. 
 The importance of incumbency in the decisions of the electorate is a difficult variable to 
measure. Lack of additional information and multi-causal variables make conclusions about the 
blame or reward attributed to a former governor open to much debate. While this factor may 
prove to be important, additional exploration on the motivation of voters is required. 
Economic Factors 
 Economic factors such as taxes, unemployment, and real-disposable income dominate the 
debate on voter decision analysis in gubernatorial elections. Political scientists in this school of 
economic retrospective voting vary on the degree of accountability and on which economic 
aspect is most important in this type of analysis. 
 In “Taxes and Voting: Electoral Retribution in the American States,” Susan L. Kone and 
Richard F. Winters (1993) examine 407 gubernatorial elections nationwide to determine the 
importance of different types of tax policies implemented throughout a governor’s 
administration. They find that an increase in sales tax has greater negative implications for a 
governor seeking reelection than an increase in the income tax. Additionally, their analysis 
shows that the impact of new program implementation is greater than marginal increases in 
existing duties. Incumbents who significantly raise taxes will face an up-hill reelection battle, if 
their challenger is able exploit and propel this issue. 
 Jason A. MacDonald and Lee Sigelman (1999) also explore public assessments of 
incumbent governors who preside over tax increases. Their findings show that while increasing 
taxes has a significant impact on elections, voters only hold the governor accountable for the 
increase if it is made during that specific election year. After accounting for other variables, the 
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authors analyzed the effects of six different types of taxes and their varying implications. They 
found that if challengers are effectively able to “blame governors and governors’ party for higher 
taxes,” this issue will become increasingly salient with voters (MacDonald and Sigelman 1999). 
Furthermore, as states increase their amount of “institutional” power, governors are held 
accountable at an increasingly higher rate.  
 Another approach finds tax increases combined with decreased disposable income and 
perceptions of a “poor” state economy “all contribute to votes against incumbent governors and 
their parties.” Richard G. Niemi, Harold W. Stanley, and Ronald J. Vogel (1995) examine 
CBS/NYT exit polls coupled with state economic data to find the association between these 
variables. The authors conclude that the governor is found responsible for the state government. 
The extent of the responsibility fluctuates from state to state and from election to election, 
depending on perceptions of the voters. The authors contend that the decision of an incumbent to 
seek reelection is based on state economic factors. The authors find that national issues coupled 
with state-level economic factors are important indicators of electoral outcome.  
 In his article, “Votes & Taxes: The Political Economy of the American Governorship,” 
Theodore J. Eismeier (1983) finds that while there is a relationship between increased taxes and 
electoral reckoning, the association is not devastating to incumbents. He examines the most 
visible types of tax increases, legislated increases and proposals. Eismeier examines election data 
from 1950 to 1980 and finds that while voters tend to punish some governors who preside over 
tax increases, many times the electorate is more lenient than expected. If tactical, incumbent 
governors are often able to shape their assessment by voters in respect to economic policy. 
 Political scientist Randall W. Partin (1995) examines the relationship between national 
economic forces and state economic forces. Partin (1995) examines data from the 1990 ANES 
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and examines voter evaluation of the economy. He controls for national forces and incumbency 
and finds that incumbent governors are held accountable for the condition of the economy. Party 
identification plays a role in this assessment. He also determines that open races “take on some 
of the external influences of the national political arena” at a higher rate than in races with an 
incumbent candidate. 
 Kevin M. Leyden and Stephen A. Borrelli (1995) examine the relationship between the 
governor and the state legislature in regard to economic responsibility. They contend that when 
the state government is “unified,” that is when the majority of both houses in the state legislature 
and the governor’s office are occupied by the same party, the incumbent is held accountable for 
state economic conditions at a much higher rate than if the state government were divided. The 
model they develop measures the “electoral consequences” of a unified government in contrast 
to a divided government. They ascertain that the in a united government, the in-party is held 
responsible for the economy by voters. The in-party candidate is not required to be an incumbent 
to be held accountable during the election. 
 By using electoral data post-World War II and multiple regression models, author Sam 
Peltzman (1987) determines that voters tend to hold the national government responsible for 
macro-economic factors. The electorate typically only holds the governor accountable when the 
state budget expands. Peltzman notes that when a governor is in the same party as a president 
with unpopular economic policies, voters are more likely to punish the president by rejecting the 
incumbent from this party. Voters send a referendum to Washington through their choice in 
gubernatorial elections. 
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Noneconomic Factors 
 In their article, “Issue Voting in Gubernatorial Election: Abortions and Post-Webster 
Politics,” Elizabeth Adell Cook, Ted G. Jelen, and Clyde Wilcox reject solely using economic 
factors as a measure when assessing gubernatorial elections (1994). By examining exit polling 
from 1989 and 1990, the authors determine that social issues, especially abortion, play a 
significant role in voters’ support for gubernatorial candidates. Post-Webster refers to the case 
decided by the Supreme Court that ultimately put more regulation power regarding abortions in 
the hands of the state government. This enlargement of gubernatorial power to influence these 
types of issues has increased the presence of these issues in campaigns. The pro-choice or pro-
life attitudes of the winners in these contests reflect the overall attitudes of the voters. Their 
findings lead the authors to conclude that “studies of gubernatorial elections would benefit from 
a consideration of noneconomic issues” (Cook 1994). 
 While noneconomic issues may have held greater influence in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the salience of these issues has most likely decreased. This is due to the increase in 
salience of economic issues. When economic conditions are less desirable and have a greater 
impact on voters, the result is most likely a decrease in importance of non-economic issues, 
simply because of the nature of the times. 
Candidate Characteristics and Personality 
 Another factor is the projected personality and the characteristics of a specific 
gubernatorial candidate. Daniel J. Benjamin and Jesse M. Shapiro attempt to measure the effects 
of “thin slice forecasts” through a study (2009). The researchers ask voters to project successful 
gubernatorial candidates based on their initial impressions from short video clips of unknown 
candidates during gubernatorial debates. The body language and overall appearance of the 
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candidate proved to be fairly successful in predicting electoral outcomes. The authors argue that 
these “forecasts” outperform even the strongest economic indicators. While this study is 
successful in predicting election outcome, it does not account for all factors that measure the 
personality characteristics of candidates, leaving it vulnerable to criticism. In fact, the authors 
acknowledge that this is not a “causal factor in determining election outcomes” (Benjamin 3).  
Data and Methods 
 The data and the methods that I employ reflect the previously mentioned theories of 
gubernatorial electoral success. I analyze four specific gubernatorial elections, economic factors, 
vote share for the 2010 election and foregoing elections, media output, and specific campaign 
spending with measurable message output. The importance of these variables and the methods of 
measurement are explained in the succeeding section. 
I account for previous theories on gubernatorial success by examining campaign 
expenditures and tax issues. Tax issues are marked by the presence of any tax increase during 
Strickland’s administration and campaign expenditures are measured using information reported 
to the Office of the Ohio Secretary of State. 
 In order to account for the partisan leanings of counties in Ohio, I examine data from the 
Presidential elections of 2000, 2004, and 2008. Those counties with a larger composite vote 
share for the Democratic presidential candidate are labeled as “blue,” while those counties with a 
larger vote share for the Republican presidential candidate are labeled as “red.” This variable is 
used to account for differences in voting patterns between “red” and “blue” counties displayed 
during the gubernatorial elections. Prior research would lead us to believe that there will be 
significant differences in voting behavior of these two types of counties regardless of economic 
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status. Economic status, as previously mentioned, is measured by unemployment statistics for the 
purpose of this analysis. 
 Additionally, the distinction between “red” and “blue” counties allows us to account for 
any drop-off rates in turnout in counties. Previous studies have shown that there is a significant 
drop in turnout of registered voters during midterm election cycles. I study these figures in order 
to account for the notion that Democratic voters may not have “turned out” for Strickland at the 
same rate as they did for Obama in 2008 or for Strickland in 2006. Moreover, Republican voters 
may have dropped-off at a lower rate than Democrats, accounting for Kasich’s victory. 
Gubernatorial Elections in the State of Ohio 
 I surveyed four modern gubernatorial elections in Ohio from 1998 through 2010. I 
utilized vote share and unemployment in all 88 Ohio counties for these elections. This 
information was available through the Ohio Secretary of State’s records and the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  
Table 1 summarizes the major variables for each election. Unemployment is calculated 
by taking the average percent of unemployed in all 88 Ohio counties for that specific year. If 
there is an incumbent, his political party is listed in the next column. Finally, the party of both 
the president and the successful electoral candidate are listed in the final two columns. 
TABLE 1 Gubernatorial Election 1998-2010 
 Unemployment Incumbent Running 
Y/N 
Incumbent’s 
Party 
President’s Party Winner’s Party 
1998 5.08 N - D R 
2002 5.83 Y R R R 
2006 5.40 N - R D 
2010 10.15 Y D D R 
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Results 
 My results include analysis of campaign expenditures, taxes, drop-off statistics, national 
forces, incumbency, the economy and media output. These factors are measured and analyzed in 
this section. 
 Prior to measuring national forces, incumbency, the economy and media output, it is 
important to explore both campaign finance and tax issues. I find that these factors are not 
significant as national forces and the economy in the 2010 gubernatorial election.  
As an incumbent governor, Strickland immediately benefitted from name-recognition. It 
was critical for the Kasich campaign to increase Kasich’s visibility through increased campaign 
spending. Spending for Kasich totaled around $17.2 million, while spending for Strickland 
totaled around $16.7 million (Associated Press 2010). While Kasich did benefit from higher 
campaign spending, incumbent Strickland benefitted from high visibility, due to his position. 
The difference in spending between the two campaigns and Strickland’s immediate visibility 
neutralize effectiveness of these factors. 
As previously stated, some scholars argue that the loss of an incumbent can be attributed 
to tax increases during his administration. While Strickland did not raise taxes during his 
administration, the Kasich campaign argued that Strickland “delayed a tax cut” (Naymik 2010). 
According to previous literature, delaying a tax cut does not have the same effect as a tax 
increase. It is doubtful, therefore, that Strickland was held accountable for this factor as 
illustrated by previous literature. I turn next to drop-off and turnout rates. 
 Along with the analysis of these variables, I performed tests to account for any cases of 
drop-off in both “red” and “blue” counties. I compared the 2010 midterm election with the 2006 
midterm election in “red” and “blue” counties. Additionally, I compared the 2010 midterm 
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election to the 2008 general election in “red” and “blue” counties. The mean drop-off rates of 
Democratic counties are displayed in Table 2. The mean drop-off rates of Republican counties 
are displayed in Table 3.  
 
 
TABLE 2 Drop-off Rates in Democratic Counties 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Drop-off 06-10 16 6.29 3.38 
Drop-off 08-10 16 21.23 3.54 
 
 
TABLE 3 Drop-off Rates in Republican Counties 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Drop-off 06-10 72 5.89 3.96 
Drop-off 08-10 72 20.12 3.64 
 
Using a two sample t-test with equal variances, I compared the statistical significance of 
the difference in Republican and Democratic counties to account for voter turnout and drop-off. 
A two-sample t-test assuming equal variances using a pooled estimate of the variance was 
performed to test the hypothesis that the resulting mean drop-off of the voter turn-out for the two 
types of counties were equal. A 95% confidence interval on the difference between “red” and 
“blue” counties using a two-sample t-test with 86 degrees of freedom indicates that drop-off rates 
from 2006 to 2010 were not significant. This test was repeated again for drop-off from 2008 to 
2010. Again drop-off rates were not statistically significant. This indicates that the Republican 
victory in 2010 was not centered on voter turnout and a significant drop-off of Democratic 
voters. This dispels the notion that Kasich benefitted electorally from a smaller drop-off, thus a 
higher turnout rate, in Republican counties.  
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Economic and National Factors 
To analyze the relationship between economic factors and voting, I computed the 
correlation between unemployment and the Democratic candidate’s percent of two-party vote 
share for governor across 88 different counties. I performed this analysis through the past four 
gubernatorial election cycles and compared this with the average unemployment for the year, as 
previously mentioned. The results are listed in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 Democratic Vote Share and Unemployment 
 Correlation (demct/unempl) Unemployment % 
1998 0.23 5.08 
2002 0.36 5.83 
2006 0.52 5.40 
2010 0.26 10.15 
 
The first column displays the results of the correlation analysis between two variables: 
unemployment and the Democratic candidate’s percent of two-party vote share for governor. The 
second column displays the average unemployment. Utilizing our knowledge of the incumbency 
status and the party status of both the gubernatorial winner and the president located in Table 1, 
we can analyze the conditions and the possible reasons for the variance in correlation. 
Table 4 leads to the conclusion that in the past four gubernatorial elections, Democratic 
candidates have benefitted from high unemployment. While the correlation between 
unemployment and the Democratic candidate’s percent of two-party vote share for governor 
varies from election to election, the correlation is always positive. Why do Democratic candidate 
benefit in counties with a higher rate of unemployment? One possible explanation is that 
Democratic officeholders have supported government programs that provide assistance to the 
unemployed. Additionally, Ohio is a state where a large number of unemployed workers lost 
their manufacturing jobs. The loss of jobs in this sector is largely blamed on free trade measures, 
25    KELLY RYBACKI 
 
most typically associated with Republicans. These unemployed workers will be more likely to 
vote for Democratic candidates. 
 In 1998, unemployment was at 5.08 percent and there was an open governor’s seat. 
Democratic president Bill Clinton was in power. The correlation between Democratic vote share 
and unemployment was at its lowest, 0.23. The Republican gubernatorial candidate, Bob Taft, 
won the election. The Democratic candidate, Lee Fisher, was unable to capitalize on 
unemployment in that election, although he still benefitted. 
 In 2002, unemployment was at 5.83 percent. This was slightly, but not extensively, 
higher than unemployment in the previous midterm election cycle. Republican incumbent Taft 
sought reelection and was victorious. The correlation between Democratic vote share and 
unemployment was higher than 1998 at 0.36. 
 Moving ahead to 2006, there were some significant changes. The governor’s seat was 
open and Republican president George W. Bush was in power at the national level. 
Unemployment was at 5.40 percent, not much of a change from 2002, but the correlation 
between Democratic vote share and unemployment was at 0.52. Democrat Ted Strickland 
became the governor of Ohio. 
 Finally in 2010, Governor Strickland sought reelection. In this election, Democratic 
president Barack Obama held power at the national level. Unemployment was at a high 10.15 
percent. The correlation between vote share and unemployment was at 0.26. Governor Strickland 
lost to challenger John Kasich.  
 These four trials performed over 88 different cases indicate that while Democratic 
gubernatorial candidates do benefit in cases of high unemployment, maximum benefit is only 
gained when a Republican president is in power. I argue that Democratic candidates, regardless 
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of incumbency status, mainly benefit from high unemployment when they are able to effectively 
shift the blame to a Republican president. This argument is applicable to the State of Ohio, not 
tested in other states.  
Media Output 
 Media output is important to measure in order to understand the ebb and flow of the 
campaign. I selected this factor for analysis not only to supplement my previous findings 
concerning national forces and economic factors, but also to obtain a deeper sense of the 
significance of the message and tone of the campaign. 
 Messaging and talking points were measured through both output by major Ohio 
newspapers and the expenditures and types of television ads produced and viewed throughout the 
campaign. In the following portion, I will explain the importance of both these measurable 
sources. 
 In the previous section of my paper, I attributed Strickland’s loss partially due to the fact 
that he was unable to shift blame for poor economic conditions onto the national level. 
Additionally, Kasich’s victory signifies that he was able to control the economic debate. If this 
theory holds, I expect that media output would reflect these factors through messaging and 
talking points.  
 Newspaper output is calculated through articles relating to the race sixteen months prior 
to the election. Six of Ohio’s major newspapers were utilized for this study. The newspapers 
include: the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Columbus Dispatch, Cincinnati Enquirer, Dayton Dailey 
News, Youngstown Vindicator and the Columbus Dispatch. The content of the compiled articles 
from each newspaper are analyzed for key terms relating to the economy, national factors, and 
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factors specific to this campaign. These key terms varied in mention throughout the election and 
functioned as a measurable output of the conversation during the campaign.  
 To further test my theory of the economic importance, national forces, and additional 
campaign messages, I selected a “dictionary” of terms and measured their occurrence in the six 
Ohio newspapers. I ran this test in May 2010 through October 2010. The terms I selected were 
based on previous literature and are utilized to further explore my theory regarding the electoral 
success of Kasich in 2010. 
 The first set of terms that I selected was grounded in national forces. First, I opted to run 
a search for the word “Obama” to determine the Democratic president’s presence throughout the 
race. The result is in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 Word Count of “Obama” 
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Next, I ran the frequency count for “Bush,” the former Republican president. The results 
are located in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 Word Count of “Bush” 
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According to the theory of blame that I offered in the previous section of my paper, 
Strickland would not benefit from a high frequency of “Obama” mentions in a time of elevated 
unemployment. As in 2006, Strickland would have greater electoral fortune if he was able to 
attribute the “blame” to a Republican president. While President Bush was not in office at this 
time, Strickland may have theoretically benefitted from increased references to the Bush 
administration. Whereas it is difficult to attribute the conversation and word frequency in the 
newspapers to one source, it can be reasoned that Strickland did not benefit from the high 
frequency of “Obama” mentions and the low frequency of “Bush” mentions. 
 Where did the Strickland campaign focus their efforts in influencing the conversation? 
Figure 3 indicates that while the Strickland campaign was effective at turning the conversation to 
“Lehman” at the beginning of the May 2010 and throughout the beginning of the summer, they 
were not able to command the same high output near the end of the election. Furthermore, by 
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focusing their efforts on pinning Kasich to Wall Street and Lehman, the campaign failed to 
address the former Republican national figure, George W. Bush. While evidence does not 
indicate whether shifting the conversation to Lehman was effective or ineffective, it does show 
that it was nearly impossible to direct the conversation to the former Republican Administration 
at the national level. Moreover, the high frequency of mentions to President Obama also 
establishes Democratic control at the national level. 
 
FIGURE 3 Word Count of “Lehman” 
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In the last leg of the election, the debate centered on the economy, as evidenced by the 
high frequency of economic terms, such as “tax” and “jobs.” These counts are displayed in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5. While discussion of economic issues was prevalent nationwide, the 
Kasich campaign was also able to effectively harness this issue and direct the conversation to 
maximize electoral benefit. I will explore this issue even further in the next section relating to 
specific campaign output.  
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FIGURE 4 Word Count of “Tax” 
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FIGURE 5 Word Count of “Jobs” 
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The graphs in this section provide a more quantitative measure of the tone of the 
campaign. The measure of word counts in the six major Ohio newspapers provides an average 
compilation of the direction of the election from May 2010 to October 2010. In the next section, 
I will provide another quantitative measure of the tone of the campaign.  
Campaign Ads and Spending 
 To account for activity and specific message decisions made by each campaign, I utilized 
campaign advertisement spending and the specific campaign ads used by each campaign. I 
collected week to week spending by both campaigns using a sample of news stations 
broadcasting to 78 of 88 counties. Broadcasts to the remaining 10 counties were either 
immeasurable or insignificant to my analysis of average output. The news stations in my sample 
include: WEWS ABC--Cleveland, WKYC NBC--Cleveland, WJW FOX--Cleveland, WHIO 
CBS--Dayton, WDTN NBC--Dayton, WBNS CBS--Columbus, WSYX ABC--Columbus, 
WTTE FOX--Columbus, WCPO ABC--Cincinnati, WKRC CBS--Cincinnati, EKRC CW--
Cincinnati, WYTV ABC--Youngstown, WYFX FOX--Youngstown, WFMJ NBC--Youngstown, 
WNWO NBC--Toledo, WTVG ABC--Toledo, WTOL CBS--Toledo, WTRF CBS--Wheeling, 
ETRF FOX--Wheeling. These nineteen stations provide an adequate measure of campaign 
output, determined by expenditures. 
 Another important factor to explore is messaging and expenditure relating to the 
campaign by outside groups. While it is difficult to measure these expenditures separate from the 
campaign, I was able to investigate the influence of the national governor’s associations. The 
Democratic Governors Association invested a minuscule amount into this campaign. In contrast, 
the Republican Governors Association’s influence was increasingly present on televisions across 
Ohio. Figure 6 displays the total ad expenditures in the sample of television stations by both 
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campaigns and the significant Republican Governors Association. While this does not account 
for total television ad expenditures, it provides a close representation of the growth television 
expenditures throughout Ohio counties. 
FIGURE 6 Expenditures by Strickland, Kasich and the RGA 
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 It is evident from the total expenditures in Figure 6 that both campaigns and the RGA 
invested increasingly high amounts into television ad messaging.  
In addition to campaign and group ad expenditures, I also analyzed the types of ads that 
the campaigns and the RGA produced. This is helpful in measuring the tone of the campaign and 
the strategies of the Kasich campaign, Strickland campaign and the RGA. In the three preceding 
tables, I analyze principle television ads of the Strickland campaign, Kasich campaign and the 
RGA. While data may vary from station to station, I include approximate air dates and the 
overall message concentration of the ads. I categorize the ads into four groups: strong positive 
message (sp), lean positive message (lp), lean negative message (ln), and strong negative 
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message (sn). The positive message group portrays that candidate in a positive manner, while the 
negative group portrays the opponent in a negative manner. Attention to the main concentration 
of the ad is also important in order to relate this to my previous argument concerning 
Strickland’s inability to achieve electoral success in the 2010 election. 
TABLE 4 Principal Campaign Ads by Kasich 
Name  Date  Main Theme Type Summary
“Record”  07/16/10  Economy Sp Centered  on touting  Kasich’s  past  leadership,  cutting 
taxes and lowering unemployment 
 
“New Day” 
General 
08/08/10  Inspirational
Economy 
 
Sp Positive message about a new direction for Ohio
“New Day” 
Cincinnati 
08/23/10  Economy Sp Focused on  reducing  the  tax burden and growing  the 
economy 
 
“Stronger Ohio”  09/05/10  Economy Sp Set at Park Ohio, Kasich discusses how to make Ohio a 
“jobs friendly” state 
 
“Opportunity”  09/17/10  Education Sp Kasich  discusses  education  reform  in  a  Columbus 
classroom 
 
“Shake‐ up”  09/24/10  Economy Sp Mary Taylor speaks of her experience as Ohio Auditor 
of State and touts Kasich’s economic plan 
 
“400,000”  10/03/10  Economy Ln Strickland  has  not  done  enough  to  save  jobs  and 
Kasich can bring these jobs back to Ohio 
 
“Compare”  10/08/10  Economy Ln Strickland  has  not  done  enough  to  save  jobs  and 
Kasich can bring these jobs back to Ohio 
 
“Shipped Away”  10/08/10  Economy Ln Strickland  has  not  done  enough  to  save  jobs  and 
Kasich can bring these jobs back to Ohio 
 
“Busted”  10/14/10  Attack 
response 
Sn Strickland  has  smeared  Kasich  and  is  attempting  to 
distract from his own failed economic policies 
 
“Strickland/ Strickland”  10/15/10  Attack
Economy 
Sn Strickland has failed Ohioans. Kasich will bring  jobs to 
Ohio 
 
“Two Paths”  10/23/10  Leadership
Economy 
Sp Kasich will bring jobs back to Ohio
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TABLE 5 Principal Campaign Ads by Strickland 
Name  Date  Main Theme Type Summary
“Good Work”  05/04/10  Wall Street
Attack 
 
Sn Centered Kasich’s votes to outsource jobs
 
“Revolving Door”  08/24/10  Wall Street
Attack 
 
Sn Kasich’s  ties  to Washington and Wall Street,  includes 
outsourcing mentions 
“Truth”  08/27/10  Economy
Attack 
Sn Kasich  ties  to  outsourcing  jobs  through  NAFTA  and 
China 
 
 
“Nilda”  08/27/10  Economy Sn Kasich and outsourcing 
 
 
“Mel”  09/25/10  Economy
Jobs 
Sp Strickland’s leadership and renewable jobs
 
 
“Listen”  09/16/10  Economy Sp Strickland’s leadership and jobs 
CEO of MiracleGro 
 
“Angry”  09/29/10  Economy Ln Strickland  will  do  a  better  job  than  Kasich  with 
economic issues. Wall Street 
 
“Time”  10/04/10  Economy
Trust 
 
Ln Strickland’s record and Kasich and Wall Street
 
“Hunters”  10/04/10  Gun Rights
 
Lp Strickland  has  a  better  record  than  Kasich  on  gun 
issues 
 
“Reform”  10/07/10  Attack 
response 
 
Ln Kasich will repeal Kasich’s reforms
 
“New Plan”  10/15/10  Trust Sn Kasich will give bonuses to his corporate friends
 
 
“Believe”  10/29/10  Leadership
 
Sp Strickland believes in Ohio 
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TABLE 6 Principal Campaign Ads by Republican Governors Association 
Name  Date  Main Theme Type Summary
“Worried”  05/21/10  Attack
 
Sn Centered on Strickland’s failed campaign promises
 
“Shift Blame”  05/22/10  Attack
 
Sn Strickland  is  trying  to  shift  the  blame for  his  poor 
record as governor 
 
“Jobs”  07/07/10  Attack Sn Strickland failed to create jobs in Ohio
 
   
“Twice”  08/25/10  Attack Sn Strickland outsourced to workers in El Salvador
 
 
“Texas”  10/01/10  Attack Sn Strickland’s and loss of stimulus money to Texas
 
 
“Gone”  10/28/10  Attack Sn Loss of jobs under Strickland 
 
 
By examining the information in the three previous tables, we can interpret various 
strategies of the Kasich and Strickland campaigns and the strategy of outside groups. Throughout 
the campaign, Kasich’s television ads focused on economic issues. Kasich “introduced” himself 
to Ohioans, touting his fiscally conservative record. As the race progressed, Kasich’s ads 
addressed economic issues throughout major regions of the state. These ads portrayed Kasich as 
capable of understanding the complex problems of an economically, socially, and politically 
diverse state. Attack ads against Strickland surfaced in October, criticizing Strickland’s job as 
governor. The Kasich campaign presents Kasich’s alternative solutions to Strickland’s failing 
policies. Despite the central attack theme of these ads, positive undertones were always present. 
The ads depicted a brighter future for Ohio with the assistance of Kasich’s leadership. The 
television ad set finishes on an extremely upbeat tone with the “Two Paths” spot, a message 
focusing on Ohio’s bright future and that echoed the economic and optimistic tone present 
throughout Kasich’s campaign. 
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In contrast, Strickland’s ads were overwhelmingly negative and labeled Kasich as a 
“Wall Street insider.” The ads pinned Kasich to outsourcing, corrupt Wall Street deals, and the 
bad practices of Lehman Brothers. The televisions spots began in May in attempt to define 
Kasich to Ohio voters. In addition to the numerous attack ads against Kasich, the Strickland 
campaign also touted Strickland’s leadership as governor and his strong pro-gun record in 
contrast to Kasich’s record. Despite the overwhelming number of negative ads focused on Wall 
Street and Lehman, Strickland managed to end on a positive note. Like Kasich’s final message, 
Strickland also focused on his optimism for better times in Ohio. 
While the Kasich campaign focused on a positive and upbeat message, the RGA attacked 
the poor economic policies of the Strickland administration. These ads portrayed “everyday 
Ohioans” talking about their economic frustrations in various settings such as the workplace, 
restaurants, and in their homes. These attacks were present throughout the campaign and focused 
on the economic policy failures of the Strickland administration.  
The set of attack ads produced by the RGA coupled with Kasich’s positive message and 
focus on the economy proved to be a successful combination for the Kasich campaign. 
Meanwhile, Strickland’s constant attacks on Kasich and his “Wall Street ties,” did very little to 
propel the success of this campaign. 
Verified through newspaper themes and television ad output, Kasich was able to 
dominate the economic debate while Strickland focused attacks on Kasich’s Wall Street ties. 
These message strategies reflected the overall tone of the campaign. Kasich’s strategy proved to 
be successful in overcoming the historic advantage of Democrats in times of economic hardship. 
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Conclusion 
 My investigation of the causal factors of John Kasich’s 2010 gubernatorial victory in 
Ohio leads to three major findings. First, I find that in that in most recent Ohio gubernatorial 
elections Democratic candidates benefit most in areas of high unemployment. My findings show 
that while the correlation between unemployment and Democratic vote share is always positive, 
the extent of the correlation varies from election to election. After accounting for drop-off, 
incumbency, total expenditures, and taxes, I find that national politics are highly related to recent 
gubernatorial elections in Ohio.  
My second conclusion is undoubtedly associated with my first conclusion, the importance 
of a candidate’s ability to control the direction of the economic debate. Strickland was unable to 
capitalize on historic advantage of Democratic candidates in times of high unemployment. 
Strickland was unable to shift the “blame” to the national level.  
In the final portion of my analysis, I verify the campaign messaging and output for the 
2010 gubernatorial elections and find that the Kasich campaign was able to effectively direct the 
economic debate while Strickland focused his strategy on unproductive attacks against Kasich’s 
ties to Wall Street. Although my analysis presents shortcomings in its ability to transcend broad 
historical periods and state boundaries, it is useful in attempting to explain the recent successes 
of gubernatorial candidates in Ohio. 
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